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Selection of Workers and 
Firm Heterogeneity George W. J. Hendrikse 
ABSTRACT. A model based on differences between workers 
regarding their preferences for wage and leisure drives the 
heterogeneity of firms result. The more industrious workers 
are driven to small firms due to free riding in large firms. An 
industry consisting of small and large firms turns out to 
produce more output han an industry consisting of only large 
firms. Some comparative statics results are derived with 
respect o the size of large firms, the productivity difference 
between firms, and monitoring capabilities. 
I .  In t roduct ion  
Casual empiricism indicates that large firms have 
difficulties organizing their research departments. 
The New York Times (1984) reported that "For 
the first time since the early days of the auto 
industry, the General Motors Corporation has 
bought a minority interest in a small company 
rather than swallowing it whole". The reasons 
given for GM's partial acquisition were: 
- -  preserving incentives in the small high tech 
firm; 
-- hiring difficulties of experienced people; 
- -  access to potential breakthroughs and guiding 
research. 
A similar example is Westinghouse and its experi- 
ence with the high tech firm Unimation. The Wall 
Street Journal (1984) reported about Westing- 
house: "They learned that their financial incentives 
would be lower under Westinghouse and they felt 
the time it took to make business decisions would 
lengthen". Williamson (1985) has reported about 
similar cases and concludes that "large companies 
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are becoming increasingly aware that the bureau- 
cratic apparatus they use to manage mature pro- 
ducts is less well-suited to supporting early stage 
entrepreneurial activity". 
There are several interesting observations tobe 
made with respect o the above phenomena. The 
first one concerns the employment of labour 
across firms. The question is whether or not the 
more productive workers are employed by large 
firms. The study by Garen (1985) predicts that 
individuals who acquire more schooling will be 
employed by larger firms and that larger firms will 
pay higher wages. Monitoring/evaluation costs 
rise with firm size in his model. Large firms rely in 
their wage compensation scheme therefore l ss on 
their own evaluation of workers than small firms 
do and more on other indicators uch as school- 
ing. Only workers with higher activity are willing 
to put forth the effort of getting ahigher education 
in order to enter a large firm and obtain a higher 
wage. Farrell and Scotchmer (1988) derive a 
similar result for partnerships. Several studies 
support his relationship empirically (Brown et al., 
1990). 
These analyses are not saying anything with 
respect o workers within a certain ability class 
(i.e., a certain level of schooling) due to unobserv- 
able characteristics of workers. Ability classes are 
usually broad and encompass many different char- 
acteristics. These differences within a certain class 
will influence the choice of a small or large firm by 
a particular worker. Our model addresses this 
question. It supports aclaim by Stigler (1962) that: 
"Men should, in general, enter smaller companies, 
the greater their ability". The explanation i  our 
model for the hypothesis of Stigler is that free 
riding in large firms drives the more industrious 
workers away from large firms, into small firms. 
They are employed by a less productive technol- 
ogy in order to prevent having free riding col- 
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leagues. The hypotheses of Garen and Stigler 
therefore both hold because one has to distinguish 
between observable and non-observable charac- 
teristics of workers, given a certain level of school- 
ing. Garen deals with observable characteristics 
whereas Stigler's hypothesis and our model are 
about unobservable characteristics. 
A second observation is that neoclassical theory 
predicts that all firms are identical in long run 
equilibrium with perfect information and free 
entry. The inefficient firms are driven out of the 
industry when profits go to zero for the most 
efficient firms. However, empirical evidence sug- 
gests that small and large firms coexist in many 
industries. The large firms are usually considered 
more productive, ceteris paribus. If the larger 
firms are more productive in fact, then the xist- 
ence of small firms remains apuzzle. Explanations 
have to deal somehow with the ceteris paribus 
condition regarding the internal functioning of 
firms. 
Firms are viewed as entities employing workers 
in a production technique. The output of the firm 
is assumed to be divided between the workers of 
the firm. A firm in which the shares of all workers 
are the same is called a partnership (Farrell 
and Scotchmer, 1988). Our reward schedule for 
workers in large firms corresponds to those of 
partnerships in section two, but workers differ 
with respect to their preference of providing 
effort. (Another difference is that incumbent 
workers can keep new workers out in the model of 
Farrell and Lander, whereas they cannot in our 
model.) Small firms employ only one worker in 
our set-up. The assumption of equal shares is 
relaxed in section three. The share in the output of 
the firm of a worker will be based upon a com- 
bination of equal share and an imperfect observa- 
tion of the effort level provided. A group of people 
with possibly unequal shares is called a team 
(Farrell and Lander, 1989). We continue to use 
the word firm for each production function, 
regardless of the number of workers employed 
and the renumeration scheme used. 
We assume that the output of each firm 
depends on the effort level provided by the 
worker(s). The production of the large firm is 
influenced by two opposing forces. On the one 
hand, the technology of the large firm is more 
productive than those of small firms, ceteris 
paribus. This might induce workers to supply 
higher levels of effort. On the other hand, the indi- 
vidual effort levels cannot be costlessly observed 
by the firm. We assume that individual remunera- 
tions have to be based on joint performance, 
which creates a moral hazard problem. Workers 
may take advantage of this by supplying less effort. 
This moral hazard problem may be dealt with by 
hiring a monitor. However, there are problems 
associated with the use of a monitor, such as 
deciding which disciplinary powers are available 
to the monitor and the possibility that the monitor 
shirks. These considerations make us pursue a 
different approach. 
One of the resons for the neo-classical result of 
identical firms in equilibrium is that labour is 
homogeneous. We will relax this assumption and 
employ a distribution of workers which will drive 
the heterogeneity of firms result. Workers are 
assumed to derive utility from wages and leisure. 
Some of them care mainly about wages, whereas 
others put more weight on leisure. Workers sort 
themselves across production techniques in order 
to maximize utility. This will result in an industry 
equilibrium consisting of small and large firms. 
Notice that the equilibrium size distribution of 
firms in this paper is not the result of a stochastic 
process, which underlies Gibrat's law (see, e.g., 
Simon and Bonini, 1958; Klepper and Graddy, 
1990), but is generated by an economic process 
(i.e., the sorting of workers across production 
techniques). The objective of this paper is not to 
derive Gibrat's law for certain types of industries, 
but to develop a model showing firm hetero- 
geneity in equilibrium due to endogenous eco- 
nomic forces. 
This article is organized as follows. Section two 
develops the model and delineates ome of the 
forces at work by an example. Section three 
analyses monitoring. Finally, a summary and 
avenues for further esearch are provided. 
II. The model 
II.1. Firms 
A firm is viewed as a production function employ- 
ing a set of workers. The small firm is charac- 
terized by production technique f~(. ) and is able 
to employ only one worker. The large firm has 
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production technique f2(" ). It is more productive 
than the small firm, ceteris paribus. We formulate 
this as f i fe1 , . . . ,  eN) > fl(el) + ' ' "  + fffeN), where 
N > 1, ei is the effort of worker i and e, ~ [0, 1]. 
If N ---- 1, then f2(el) is defined to be zero, regard- 
less of the effort level provided. We assume that 
both fl(" ) and f2(" ) are strictly monotonic, con- 
tinuous and concave. 
The fruits of production of the small firm go 
completely to the worker. (The worker is self- 
employed.) Workers in a large firm split the gain of 
their productive fforts equally. 
I1.2. Workers 
Each worker is characterized by an utility func- 
tion. The utility of each worker depends on the 
effort level, e, provided on the job and the wage, w, 
that will be paid for services rendered. Workers 
have to make two choices. They have to decide 
what effort levels they are going to provide and by 
which firm they want to be employed. Workers are 
assumed to maximize xpected utility and are risk 
neutral. 
There are two types of workers in the economy. 
Type I (industrious) workers have utility function 
Ul(w, e) -- w. Type II (lazy) workers are charac- 
terized by utility function U2(w, e), where U 2 > 
0, U 2 < 0 and is continuous and strictly quasi 
concave. 
A partition at -- {So . . . . .  S~:} of the set of 
workers S satisfies 
K 
U Sk=S 
k=O 
Sk#O,  kE{O, . . . , k}  
Sk N Sin--O, withk#m,k ,m~{O, . . . , k} ,  
where S O is defined as the set of workers employed 
by small firms and S k in the set of workers 
employed by large firm k, k -- 1 , . . . ,  K. Define M 
as the set of workers of type I and N as the set of 
workers of type II, so that S = M U N. 
Given at, let e,k denote the effort level of worker 
i in S k and the vector e k = (eik) for all j E S k. If 
i E Sk, then define e), ---- (ejk) for all j ~ Sk\{i }. 
An effort allocation is the (K + 1)-tuple E = (e0, 
el . . . . .  eK). Define E' = (e0, el . . . .  , e~ . . . . .  eK). 
The problem facing worker i, employed by firm 
k, is deciding what effort level to supply, given the 
effort levels of the other workers employed by 
firm k. For a given partition at and effort alloca- 
tion E, define e~k as the solution value of e,k for the 
problem 
U'(e~k) = max U'(w k, e,k) 
e,k 
A(e,k) , k = 0 
s.t. w k = fffek, e,k)/Iskl, k= 1 . . . .  ,K, 
where I Ski is the number of workers employed in 
firm k. Notice that each worker in a large firm 
receives a wage which is an equal share of the 
output of the firm. The optimal firm for worker i is 
k*, given at and E, which is the solution to the 
problem 
U'(e~k.) = max Ui(Wk, e,~). 
k 
11.3. Equilibrium 
The economic process is modelled as a two stage 
game. In the first stage, workers decide by which 
firm they want o be employed; in the second 
stage, workers decide on an optimal effort level, 
taking first-stage decisions as given. The game will 
be solved for its subgame perfect Nash equilib- 
rium. This is done by using the method of back- 
ward induction. So we find an optimal effort level 
for each worker, given a certain coalition struc- 
ture. Next, workers choose by which firm they 
want to be employed, taking into account the 
effort levels that will be chosen in the second stage. 
Formally, an equilibrium coalition structure is a 
partition and an effort allocation {at, E} ---- {(So, 
9 . . ,  Sk), (e0, 9  ek)} such that 
ViEs, ~,~ ,, ,,k{U/(~,k) > U(w~, e,k)} 
V, Es, J~ ,, k{Ui(e,~) > U'(w,, e,k)}, 
where k -- 0 . . . . .  K. 
11.4. Example 
We will formulate an example showing that an 
industry consisting of small and large firms out- 
performs an industry composed of only large 
firms. It turns out that even for large productivity 
differences the free riding in large firms is respon- 
sible for industrious workers choosing small firms. 
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Suppose that there is one industrious worker 
with utility function Ul(w, e) ~- w. There are two 
type II workers and the utility function of such a 
worker is U2(w, e) = w - c(e), where c ( ' )  is a 
convex function. We will take c(e) = e 2. The 
production technology of a small firm is f~(e) -- e 
and the technology of the large firm is 
~(el/, . . . . .  elsklk) = a ~ e,k, 
where the productivity parameter a is larger than 
one. This choice reflects the assumption that large 
firms are more productive than small firms, ceteris 
paribus. The second stage problem of worker i is 
U'(e*k) = max U'(wk, e,~) 
[ A(e,k) , k -- 0 
s.t. wk = f2(e~k . . . . .  eskl~)/lSk[, k----1 . . . . .  K. 
The first stage problem of worker i is 
U'(e,~,) -- max Ui(wk, e'k). 
k 
Two conditions will now be formulated in order 
to establish that an industry consisting of small and 
large firms is an equilibrium coalition structure. 
Suppose that the industrious worker is employed 
by a small firm and the two lazy workers by a large 
firm. The effort level provided by the industrious 
worker is 1, whereas the lazy workers supply an 
effort level equal to a/4, which is the solution of 
the symmetric Nash-equilibrium. The utility levels 
are 1 and 3a2/16, respectively. If a type II worker 
is employed by a small firm, then his utility maxi- 
mizing effort level is 1/2 and the corresponding 
utility level is 1/4. A lazy worker will therefore not 
move to a small firm when 
3a 2 >1 4. 
It has also to be ensured that an industrious 
worker does not move to a large firm. Suppose 
that there is just one large firm. The industrious 
worker will supply an effort level of one and the 
lazy workers supply a/18. The wage received by 
every worker is a(3 + a)/9. The industrious 
worker will not stay in this large firm when 
a(3 + a) < 9. 
The industry structure consisting of one small firm 
employing the industrious worker and one large 
firm employing the lazy workers is an equilibrium 
industry structure when the above inequalities are 
satisfied. This is achieved when 
2 /~ < a < ~i- i .25-  1.5. 
So, there is a range of intermediate values of the 
productivity parameter a for which small and 
large firms exist together. If the large firm is much 
more productive than the small firm, then the 
small firm will disappear and the industrious 
worker will be employed by a large firm. On the 
other hand, a small productivity difference be- 
tween small and large firms will eliminate the large 
firm because the higher productivity of the large 
firm will not compensate he lazy worker enough 
for the free riding of his colleague. 
The industry structure of one small and one 
large firm is not only an equilibrium for inter- 
mediate values of the productivity parameter but it 
is also attractive from an output point of view. The 
industry output when there is one large and one 
small firm is 
1 + a2/2. 
The industry consisting of one large firm produces 
a(9 + a)/9. 
It is easy to show that the industry output of one 
small and one large firm is always higher than the 
output of an industry consisting of just one large 
firm. 
Notice that the above example is not sensitive 
to the number of industrious and lazy workers. A 
large firm will in equilibrium consist of a limited 
number of lazy workers, because utility levels will 
decrease beyond a certain firm size. (Utility levels 
decrease already beyond two workers in the above 
example with c(e) = e2.) This is due to the 
reduction in disutility of effort not being large 
enough to compensate for the lower wage. The 
industry output result in the above example is also 
not affected by the number of lazy workers, 
because the production of a large firm consisting 
of only lazy workers is always a2/2. Finally, 
observe that both types of workers are needed in 
order to get the heterogeneity of firms result. Only 
one type of worker will result in all firms being 
identical, except for some cases with integer 
problems. 
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IlL Monitoring 
This section will investigate the effect of moni- 
toring on the productivity of the large firm and the 
coexistence of small and large firms. The moni- 
toting technology will be modelled by adopting 
the specification of Farrell and Lander (1989). 
They distinguish between two types of effort. A 
selfish effort level represents the activities pend 
on promoting private returns, whereas a team 
effort level contributes to the team's goal, i.e., 
production. The costs of these two effort levels are 
born by the worker and unobservable. In return, 
he gets a share of the team's benefit. This share 
consists of a fixed component and some imperfect 
indicator of the team effort level provided by the 
worker. The fixed component is determined by the 
number of workers in the firm, whereas the 
imperfectness of the indicator epresents how well 
the team effort level is measured. This is modelled 
by a weighted sum of team and selfish effort level. 
Each worker decides which selfish and team effort 
level to provide. 
III.1. Mode l  
Each individual chooses aselfish effort level s, and 
a team effort level el. We will assume that these 
effort levels are in the unit interval. A type II 
worker bears an unobservable direct cost c(si + 
e,), which we assume is differentiable, increasing 
and convex. A type I worker does not incur cost of 
supplying effort. Workers get a share of the output 
of the firm. The fractional share, ri, of the output 
in firm k that worker i receives i  
where 
3, - + (1  - 
is observable. The share a, depends on r i (an 
imperfect indicator of e/) in order to encourage 
team effort. The parameter 7 describes how well 
ri measures e,, and 6 represents he weight given 
to this imperfect observation i  setting members' 
rewards. It is assumed that ~ is smaller than 0.5. 
A lazy worker i employed by firm k chooses e;k 
and S~k to maximize 
= . + 
Two first-order conditions regarding type I workers 
are obtained by calculating the symmetric Nash- 
equilibrium in the second stage. The comparative 
statics results are those of Farrell and Lander 
(1989). They show that the team effort is nega- 
tively related to the number of workers employed 
by the firm. This is the free riding effect. The 
second comparative statics result is that improved 
monitoring capabilities (7) of a large firm in- 
creases the attractiveness of greater team effort 
levels, i.e., less imperfect devices to measure  i will 
result in higher levels of ei. More weight given to e, 
in the determination of ri implies that less weight 
is given to the selfish effort level s i. However, the 
cost of supplying effort remains the same, which 
induces a worker to reduce his selfish effort level. 
Improved monitoring capabilities are therefore 
positively related to team effort levels and nega- 
tively related to selfish effort levels. 
The above result regarding the monitoring 
capabilities uggests that the range of parmeter- 
values for which small firms exist is negatively 
related to X- Large firms are faced in the above 
model with the difficulty of assessing individual 
contributions to output. Once these problems are 
reduced by increasing monitoring capabilities, 
then their superior productivity features more 
prominently. Greater team effort levels in large 
firms will increase payments in large firms. This 
might be sufficient o attract industrious workers, 
away from small firms. 
The allocation of workers across firms is given 
when the choices in the second stage of the game 
are made. These second stage decisions are taken 
into account when the choice of the firm by a 
worker is considered in the first stage. It is there- 
fore not obvious how the size of the large firm will 
change due to a change in the monitoring capa- 
bilities. First, improved monitoring capabilities 
will result in a higher effort level by a lazy worker. 
This will increase the wage received, but also the 
cost of providing the higher level of effort. This 
last effect may dominate and actually reduce the 
size of the firm. The next subsection will show this 
with an example. Second, an increase in these 
capabilities will increase the team effort level 
provided by a type two worker. This makes it 
more attractive for an additional worker to move 
to a large firm. However, this move increases the 
free riding problem and may prevent the move. 
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Ili.2. Example 
The example of subsection 11.4 is appropriately 
adapted in order to take the monitoring technol- 
ogy into account. Suppose that c(e + s) = (e + s) 2. 
If a large firm is employing n type U workers, then 
the utility maximizing selfish and team effort level 
are 
e = a(1 - y)2/2n(2d + 1) (1 - 2)') 2 
and 
s = (2d - ),(40 + 1)) x 
x a(1 - )')/2n(2d + 1) (1 - 2)') 2, 
when there is an interior solution. Two effects are 
clearly illustrated by the above expressions. First, 
improved monitoring capabilities ()') will induce 
higher team effort levels by the individual workers. 
This will attract more workers to a firm. Second, 
more workers (n) in a firm exacerbates the free 
riding problem. This might prevent an increase in 
the size of the firm. 
Improved monitoring capabilities may actually 
reduce the size of the firm. This depends on the 
utility of higher wages versus the disutility of 
providing higher effort levels. Only type II workers 
are needed to illustrate this claim. 
It can be shown that for a -- 2, d -- 0.8 and )' -- 
0.2 a large firm consisting of two workers can not 
exist in equilibrium. Both workers are rather self- 
employed. However, a large firm consisting of 
three workers exists in equilibrium for )' -- 0.2. 
The lower effort level due to more free riding and 
the moreless low level of the monitoring capa- 
bilities results in a lower wage received by each 
worker. However, this is more than compensated 
for by the reduction in the cost of providing effort. 
Improved monitoring capabilities, e.g., )' -- 0.22, 
will result in utility levels for labor in a large firm 
consisting of two workers which are higher than 
the self-employment utility level. 
The comparative statics results regarding the 
weight given to the imperfect observation in 
setting members' rewards are counterintuitive. An
increase in d will reduce the effort level provided 
for the team (e), whereas the s lfish effort level (s) 
will increase. The increase in d puts more weight 
on the imperfect indicator of the effort level 
supplied (r). Recall that this indicator is a linear 
combination of the team and selfish effort levels. 
The weight put on the team effort level (7) is by 
assumption smaller than 0.5. The most attractive 
way of increasing r for the worker is therefore to 
increase s and lower e. 
IV. Summary and further research 
We have developed a model in which workers first 
choose a firm and next decide upon an effort level. 
A large firm is assumed to be more productive 
than a smaller firm, ceteris paribus. However, 
small firms exist for intermediate values of the 
productivity diference parameter. Thefree riding 
in large firms is responsible for this result because 
it drives some workers into small firms. Workers 
with a strong preference for high wages are driven 
to small firms, whereas those having a strong 
preference for leisure are employed by large firms. 
It turns out that an industry structure consisting of 
small and large firms may produce more than an 
industry consisting of only large firms because the 
small firms provide a lower bound on the free 
riding in large firms. 
The introduction of a monitoring technology 
shows that the relationship between the moni- 
toring capability and the attractiveness of large 
firms for industrious workers depends on several 
endogenous vraiables. Improved monitoring capa- 
bilities induce higher team effort levels in the 
second stage, but this attracts more workers and 
therefore worsens the free riding problem. 
An avenue for future research might be to look 
at optimal reward schedules. We have not ex- 
plored the possible benefits and costs of contract- 
ing. Various parameters which might be part of a 
contract were treated as exogenous variables in 
the above model. Some of the comparative statics 
results regarding these parameters might be quali- 
fied when they are determined together. 
We have only distinguished small and large 
firms. It might be desirable to split the category of 
small firms into two categories. Workers seeking 
employment by small firms might choose to work 
in a small firm as an employee or work for them- 
selves. A force guiding the selection of workers in 
such an environment might be differences between 
risk postures in the population of workers. Firm 
heterogeneity was driven in our model by eco- 
nomic forces. A richer model explaining the size 
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distribution of firms has to include other aspects 
like the size and composition of demand, financial 
constraints and a richer description of the motiva- 
tion of entrepreneurs (e.g., Kandel and Lazear, 
1990; Brown et al., 1990). 
The research and development aspects of the 
cases described in the introduction were not 
treated. Geroski (1990) summarized his empirical 
findings regarding the relationship between inno- 
vation and industry structure by "... our data 
suggests that the price which has to be paid for 
high levels of innovation may not include toler- 
ating the growth of highly concentrated, imper- 
fectly competitive market structures". Our model 
might address some of the issues involved. The 
analysis suggests that an industry consisting of 
small and large firms might achieve an innovation 
earlier than an industry consisting of just large 
firms, due to increased competition more than 
offsetting the free riding in large firms with the 
superior technology. 
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